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  1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) operates an online platform that enables people around the 
world to connect and share with those who matter to them and to discover content that may 
interest them.  Facebook also allows people to place ads about products and services they offer 
and to target the people who are most likely to be interested in them.  Advertisers using 
traditional print and broadcast media have done this for decades—for example, by running ads 
for women’s clothing in Vogue or during Oprah, for men’s athletic shoes in Sports Illustrated or 
during the Super Bowl, for Spanish-speaking audiences on Telemundo, and for back-to-school 
sales in Parents magazine.       
Advertisers on Facebook similarly can use self-serve tools that allow, but do not require, 
them to target their ads based on information users provide through their activities on Facebook, 
including gender, location, and thousands of interests.  Facebook provides guidelines about what 
type of ad content is allowed on its service and makes clear that discrimination, including 
through use of these targeting tools, is strictly prohibited.  Facebook has also implemented a 
series of technical changes intended to prevent such misuse.  Plaintiffs, nevertheless, bring this 
case against Facebook, alleging that Facebook is liable under the Fair Housing Act and New 
York Human Rights Law because these targeting tools make it possible for advertisers to place 
discriminatory housing ads on Facebook—though Plaintiffs do not identify any such ads.     
Plaintiffs’ claims suffer from multiple fatal defects, but the Court need not reach those 
issues because this case should be transferred to the Northern District of California.  Plaintiffs 
agreed to resolve any claims against Facebook in California and offer no reason to suggest they 
should not be bound by that agreement.  Transfer is also warranted by the first-filed rule, because 
another case asserting substantially the same claims has been pending in that district for well 
over a year, and under the factors considered in the 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) transfer analysis. 
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Alternatively, this case should be dismissed on multiple independent grounds.  First, 
Plaintiffs do not allege facts establishing personal jurisdiction over Facebook in New York.  
Facebook is not subject to general jurisdiction in New York, and specific jurisdiction does not 
exist because Facebook’s ad platform and the challenged targeting tools are available for use by 
all advertisers in all housing markets throughout the United States.  Plaintiffs’ claims therefore 
do not arise out of any conduct by Facebook directed toward New York. 
Second, Plaintiffs have not alleged any actual injury to establish Article III standing 
because they allege only that the targeting tools make it possible for third parties to place 
discriminatory housing ads on Facebook, but that does not establish an injury in fact that is fairly 
traceable to alleged wrongdoing by Facebook.   
Third, the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) bars all of Plaintiffs’ claims because 
they are premised on the publication of allegedly discriminatory housing ads by third parties on 
Facebook, and therefore seek to hold Facebook liable “as the publisher or speaker” of third-party 
content in violation of the CDA.  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  In Plaintiffs’ own words, Facebook 
allegedly “provides the option for advertisers to exclude [protected classes] from receiving 
[housing] advertisements” and “permits advertisers to publish these ads in a discriminatory 
manner.”  Compl. ¶ 4 (emphases added).  Advertisers, not Facebook, are responsible for what 
Plaintiffs allege may result in publication of discriminatory housing ads on Facebook: advertisers 
create the ad content—i.e. text or images—offering housing opportunities, and select the 
targeting options Plaintiffs claim are discriminatory when used in conjunction with housing ads.  
Facebook’s provision of neutral tools allowing all advertisers to engage in the commonplace 
practice of targeted advertising that, according to Plaintiffs, some housing advertisers may 
choose to use for an unlawful purpose falls squarely within the scope of CDA immunity. 
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Finally, Plaintiffs fail to state any claim against Facebook under the Fair Housing Act or 
New York law.  Plaintiffs’ theory of liability under the Fair Housing Act is not supported by the 
text of the asserted statutory provisions and regulations, and has never been accepted by any 
court applying those laws.  And New York law does not apply here, as Plaintiffs agreed to a 
California choice-of-law provision when creating and continuing to use their Facebook accounts.  
But Plaintiffs’ claims fail in any event because they do not and cannot allege any discriminatory 
act or intent by Facebook related to any use of the targeting tools by advertisers.   
II. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS 
Third parties can place ads on Facebook using self-serve tools available on Facebook’s 
ad platform.  Compl. ¶¶ 40-44.  Advertisers upload text and/or images, set a budget and billing 
method, and then have the option to select an audience using tools that allow them to include 
and/or exclude “hundreds of demographics, behaviors, and interests.”  Id. ¶¶ 45-50.  Plaintiffs 
refer to these tools as “pre-populated lists,” but, as depicted in Exhibit A to the complaint, they 
are actually drop-down menus from which advertisers may (but are not required to) select one or 
more—or none—of the options listed.  Among the targeting options challenged by Plaintiffs are 
multicultural affinities,1 men, women, parents with early school-age children, moms of grade 
                                                 
1 Plaintiffs acknowledge that these targeting options are no longer available for housing ads, but 
wrongly allege that they “provided housing advertisers with the option of excluding [Facebook 
users] on the basis of … race and national origin.”  Compl. ¶¶ 74(a), (b).  As Facebook has 
explained publicly, including in statements quoted in the complaint, multicultural affinity is not 
based on a user’s race or national origin.  Facebook does not collect information on the race or 
ethnicity of its users, and does not permit users to provide that information in their user profiles.  
Instead, users become part of a “multicultural affinity” audience when, through their activities on 
Facebook, they express an interest in content related to African-American, Asian-American, 
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school kids, moms of high school kids, fit moms, soccer moms, disabled American veterans, 
disabled parking permit, disability.gov, Telemundo, and other targeting options Plaintiffs allege 
reflect “interests that are the equivalent of protected characteristics.”  Id. ¶ 74.   
According to Plaintiffs, by making these targeting tools available on its ad platform, 
Facebook “makes it possible” for advertisers to publish discriminatory housing ads on Facebook.  
Compl. ¶ 2 (Facebook “enable[s] landlords and real estate brokers to bar families with children, 
women, and others from receiving rental and sales ads for housing” and “makes it possible for 
housing advertisers to exclude certain home seekers from ever seeing their ads”) (emphases 
added); see also id. ¶ 4 (Facebook “provides the option for advertisers to exclude families with 
children and women from receiving advertisements, as well as users with interests based on 
disabilities and national origin,” and “approves and permits advertisers to publish these ads in a 
discriminatory manner”) (emphasis added). 
But Plaintiffs do not, and cannot, allege that the targeting tools have no lawful purpose.  
For example, a Spanish-language publication may target ads to users who have expressed an 
interest in Telemundo and/or the Hispanic (Spanish dominant) affinity; a seller of women’s 
clothing may choose to target ads to women; a yoga studio may choose to target ads to users who 
have expressed an interest in fit moms; or an organization serving persons with disabilities may 
target ads to users who have expressed an interest in disability.gov or disabled American 
veterans.   
                                                 
Hispanic, Hispanic (Bilingual), Hispanic (Spanish dominant), or Hispanic (English dominant) 
communities.  Because multicultural affinities are based on interests and not race or ethnicity, 
users may be in one or more—or none—of these affinities at a given time and move between 
them over time as their activities on Facebook change.  
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Advertisers may also use the targeting tools to exclude certain audiences in ways that are 
lawful and not discriminatory, and in fact promote diversity and inclusion through “parallel 
advertising.”  For example, an advertiser may run two ads on Facebook for the same product, 
one in Spanish and the other in English.  To avoid duplication, the advertiser can target the 
Spanish ad to users expressing an interest in Telemundo and/or the Hispanic (Spanish dominant) 
affinity and the English ad to exclude those audiences because they were targeted to receive the 
Spanish ad.  This is more efficient for the advertiser and provides a better user experience.   
Advertisers can also run parallel ads through varying media channels.  For example, an 
advertiser that wants to run an ad in Spanish and English for the same product might create a 
Spanish ad to run on Telemundo and an English ad to run on Facebook, targeting it to exclude 
users who have expressed an interest in Telemundo, since that audience was already targeted to 
see the ad on Telemundo.  Similarly, a real estate agent marketing a house he believes is 
especially appealing to families may run ads on Facebook or across advertising media using 
different creatives, one with a picture of a playset in the backyard and one with a picture of the 
kitchen.  The agent might run the playset image on local parenting blogs and/or on Facebook 
targeting it to audiences who have expressed an interest in parenting-related topics (e.g., parents 
with toddlers) and run the kitchen image on Facebook excluding the same parenting-related 
options because those audience segments have already been targeted through other advertising 
on Facebook and other advertising media.   
Plaintiffs also do not, and cannot, allege any discriminatory conduct by Facebook.  In 
fact, Plaintiffs repeatedly acknowledge that it is the advertisers—not Facebook—who decide 
whether and how to use the targeting tools they challenge.  In fact, Facebook explicitly prohibits 
discrimination on Facebook, including through use of its ad targeting tools, and requires all 
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advertisers to comply with its policies and all applicable antidiscrimination laws.2 
At bottom, Plaintiffs’ claims against Facebook are based on its operation of an online 
platform that allows third parties to publish ads using neutral, self-serve tools.  That certain third 
parties may misuse these tools for the purpose of publishing discriminatory housing ads is 
something Facebook takes seriously and has taken significant steps to address.  But it does not 
render Facebook liable for any such ads under the federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 
(a), (c), (f); or the New York Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(6).   
III. THIS CASE SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
Transfer of this case to the Northern District of California is warranted on three 
independent grounds: (1) Plaintiffs agreed to a forum selection clause requiring them to litigate 
any claims against Facebook in California, (2) a “competing lawsuit” is already pending in the 
Northern District of California, and (3) transfer serves “the interests of convenience and justice” 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 
                                                 
2 See Declaration of Rosemarie T. Ring (“Ring Decl.”), Ex. A [“[A]dvertisers may not (1) use 
our audience selection tools to (a) wrongfully target specific groups of people for advertising …; 
or (b) wrongfully exclude specific groups of people from seeing their ads; or (2) include 
discriminatory content in their ads.”]; see also Ex. B (Advertising Policy 7.1 mandates that 
advertisers “must not use targeting options to discriminate against … users[.]”).  Facebook’s 
motion to dismiss can and should be granted regardless of whether the Court takes judicial notice 
of these documents, which simply provide additional “factual background of the case.”  Roberts 
v. Babkiewicz, 582 F.3d 418, 419 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam); see also Request for Judicial 
Notice (filed concurrently with this motion). 
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A. Plaintiffs Agreed to Litigate Any Claims Against Facebook in California  
All of the Plaintiffs have active Facebook accounts.  See Compl. ¶¶ 75-100.  When 
creating their accounts, each of them agreed to Facebook’s Terms of Use, sometimes referred to 
as the Statement of Rights and Responsibilities (“SRRs”), a binding contract that governs the 
relationship between Plaintiffs and Facebook.  Declaration of Michael Duffey (“Duffey Decl.”) 
¶¶ 5-9, 15-16, 22-23, 29-30, 36-37; see, e.g., Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 834-
35, 841 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (transferring case to N.D. Cal. because plaintiff “assented to” 
Facebook’s SRRs and “agreed to litigate all disputes regarding his Facebook account” in that 
district); E.K.D. ex rel. Dawes v. Facebook, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 2d 894, 905-06 (S.D. Ill. 2012) 
(transferring case to N.D. Cal. because the plaintiff agreed to Facebook’s SRRs and forum 
selection clause); Dolin v. Facebook, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3d 1153, 1160-61 (D. Haw. 2018) 
(same); Miller v. Facebook, Inc.,  2010 WL 9525523, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Jan 15, 2010) (same).  In 
agreeing to these terms, each of the Plaintiffs also agreed to be bound by later updates to the 
terms.  See Duffey Decl. ¶¶ 15, 22, 29, 36 & Exs. B, D, F.  
Facebook’s current terms of service include the following forum selection and choice-of-
law clause: 
For any claim, cause of action, or dispute you have against us that arises out of 
or relates to these Terms or the Facebook Products (“claim”), you agree that it 
will be resolved exclusively in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California or a state court located in San Mateo County.  You also agree to submit 
to the personal jurisdiction of either of these courts for the purpose of litigating 
any such claim, and that the laws of the State of California will govern these 
Terms and any claim, without regard to conflict of law provisions. 
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Ring Decl., Ex C at 6-7 (emphases added).  Each Plaintiff therefore has agreed to bring any 
claim against Facebook arising out or relating to Facebook exclusively in the Northern District 
of California or San Mateo Superior Court.3 
“[A] valid forum-selection clause [should be] given controlling weight in all but the most 
exceptional cases.”  Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 
49, 63 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also New Moon Shipping Co. v. MAN B&W 
Diesel AG, 121 F.3d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1997) (“A forum selection clause is enforceable unless it is 
shown that to enforce it would be unreasonable and unjust or that some invalidity such as fraud 
or overreaching is attached to it.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Accordingly, 
where, as here, the parties have agreed to a valid forum selection clause, Plaintiffs’ choice of 
forum “merits no weight” and Plaintiffs “bear[] the burden of establishing that transfer to the 
forum for which the parties bargained is unwarranted.”  Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 63.  By agreeing 
to the SRR’s forum selection clause, Plaintiffs also have “waive[d] the right to challenge the 
preselected forum as inconvenient or less convenient for themselves or their witnesses, or for 
their pursuit of the litigation.”  Id. at 64.  Because the remaining factors4 of the transfer analysis 
                                                 
3 Each Plaintiff also agreed to a similar California forum selection clause at the time they agreed 
to the terms when they signed up for Facebook.  See Duffey Decl. ¶¶ 16, 23, 30, 37.  Three of the 
four Plaintiffs agreed to a California choice-of-law clause at the time they signed up for 
Facebook; the fourth, NFHA, agreed to a Delaware choice-of-law clause, see id., though that has 
since been superseded by the current California choice-of-law clause. 
4 The “[p]ublic-interest factors” that may be considered even where a valid forum selection 
clause applies “may include: the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the 
local interest in having localized controversies decided at home; [and] the interest in having the 
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“will rarely defeat a transfer motion, the practical result is that forum-selection clauses should 
control except in unusual cases.”  Id.  
Here, there can be no dispute that Plaintiffs agreed to the forum selection clause because 
they could not otherwise have registered for a Facebook account.  See Duffey Decl. ¶ 9; Fteja, 
841 F. Supp. 2d at 835 (“In order to have obtained a Facebook account, Fteja must have” 
assented to forum selection clause.).  Because the forum selection clause is presumptively 
enforceable and Plaintiffs cannot carry the “heavy burden” of demonstrating that the clause 
should be invalidated, and because “‘the interest of justice’ is served by holding parties to their 
bargain,” this action should be transferred to the Northern District of California.  Atl. Marine, 
571 U.S. at 66. 
B. A “Competing Lawsuit” Has Been Pending in the Northern District of 
California for Over a Year 
“[W]here there are two competing lawsuits, the first suit should have priority, absent the 
showing of balance of convenience or special circumstances giving priority to the second.”  First 
City Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Simmons, 878 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1989).  Cases “compete” when 
there are “sufficient overlapping factual and legal issues” between them.  MasterCard Int’l, Inc. 
v. Lexcel Solutions, Inc., 2004 WL 1368299, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2004).  Strong policy 
considerations dictate application of this rule to prevent duplicative litigation and promote 
“[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and 
comprehensive disposition of litigation[.]”  Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C–O–Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 
U.S. 180, 183 (1952). 
                                                 
trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law.”  Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 62 n.6 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Plainly, none of these factors apply here.  
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Here, the first-filed case, Mobley v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:16-cv-06440-EJD (N.D. Cal.), 
which has been pending in the Northern District of California for well over a year, is a 
“competing lawsuit” because, just as Plaintiffs do here, the Mobley plaintiffs assert claims 
against Facebook under the Fair Housing Act based on allegations that advertisers may use 
neutral targeting tools on Facebook’s ad platform to place discriminatory housing ads.  See supra 
at 3-6; Ring Decl., Exs. D, E (Mobley complaints).  The policy justifications underlying 
application of the first-filed rules exist even where non-overlapping claims and parties exist.  For 
example, in United States ex rel. Cestra v. Cephalon, Inc., 2014 WL 1087960, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 19, 2014), the court applied the first-filed rule because, notwithstanding different parties 
and claims, transfer served the interests of judicial economy and comity because the two actions 
“share[d] significant factual allegations, legal issues, and parties.”  See also Wyler-Wittenberg v. 
MetLife Home Loans, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 2d 235, 244-45 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (same); Tate-Small v. 
Saks Inc., 2012 WL 1957709, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2012) (same).   
The same is true here.  This case and Mobley require resolution of the same core factual 
and legal issues, including how Facebook’s ad platform and targeting tools work, whether claims 
against Facebook based on ad targeting by advertisers are barred by the CDA or fail for lack of 
standing, and the viability of plaintiffs’ novel theory under the FHA that a publisher can be liable 
for the targeting decisions of advertisers.  Because these issues are currently pending before the 
Mobley court in the Northern District of California, allowing this case to proceed in this district 
would “present[] redundancies that contravene the interests of judicial economy and implicate 
issues of comity.”  Cephalon, 2014 WL 1087960, at *6.5 
                                                 
5 Neither exception to the first-filed rule applies.  As discussed infra, the “balance of 
convenience” factors weigh in favor of transfer.  See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Fox Entm’t 
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C. Transfer to the Northern District of California Serves the “Interests of 
Convenience and Justice” Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) 
Courts evaluating whether transfer serves the interests of convenience and justice under 
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) typically consider: (1) the convenience of the witnesses; (2) the convenience 
of the parties; (3) the location of relevant documents and relative ease of access to sources of 
proof; (4) the location of operative facts; (5) the availability of process to compel the attendance 
of unwilling witnesses; (6) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law; (7) the relative means 
of the parties; (8) the weight afforded plaintiff’s choice of forum; and (9) judicial economy and 
the interests of justice generally.  See Eres N.V. v. Citgo Asphalt Refining Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 
473, 478-79 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
Here, these factors weigh in favor of transfer.  Because Facebook is headquartered in 
California, and Plaintiffs’ claims challenges Facebook’s advertising policies, practices and 
platform, it will be far more convenient to litigate this case in California than in New York.  All 
or nearly all of the witnesses who will testify about Facebook’s advertising policies, practices 
and platform will be Facebook employees based in California.  See Duffey Decl. ¶ 3.  Likewise, 
all of the relevant documents and sources of proof are likely to be located in California.  See id. 
¶ 4.  The locus of operative facts is also in California because Facebook makes decisions about 
its advertising policies, practices and platform at its Menlo Park headquarters.  See id. ¶ 3; see 
                                                 
Grp., Inc., 522 F.3d 271, 275 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining that the “balance of convenience” 
factors “are essentially the same as those considered in connection with motions to transfer 
venue” under section 1404(a)).  And no “special circumstances,” such as obviously forum 
shopping, exist that warrant giving priority to this case over Mobley, since the Mobley plaintiffs 
filed their case well over a year ago in the district where Facebook is headquartered, consistent 
with the forum selection clause also agreed to by Plaintiffs in this case.  Id. 
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also 800-Flowers, Inc. v. Intercontinental Florist, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 128, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) 
(locus of operative facts where defendant’s business decisions and practices occurred).       
Judicial economy and the interests of justice also weigh heavily in favor of transfer.  As 
discussed supra, the interests of justice are served by enforcing Plaintiffs’ agreement to litigate 
any claims against Facebook in California, which also waived their right to challenge that forum 
as inconvenient and means their choice of any other forum is given no weight in this analysis.  
Moreover, Mobley, a “competing lawsuit,” has been pending in California for over 18 months.   
The remaining factors are neutral or should be given little weight.  Both districts are 
familiar with the relevant law.  There are no facts to indicate that Plaintiffs would be unable to 
litigate this action in California, since NFHA is a national organization and two of the other three 
Plaintiffs reside outside of this district and would have to expend comparable resources 
regardless of venue.  See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 844.  Plaintiffs’ choice of forum should be 
given little weight, as only one Plaintiff is located in this district.  Moreover, the importance of a 
plaintiff’s choice of forum is significantly reduced when, as here, “the operative facts have few 
meaningful connections to the plaintiff’s chosen forum.”  Eres N.V., 605 F. Supp. 2d at 483. 
************** 
This case should be transferred to the Northern District of California for all of the reasons 
set forth above.  If the Court does not transfer the case, Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed on 
multiple independent grounds. 
IV. PLAINTIFFS DO NOT ALLEGE FACTS ESTABLISHING PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION OVER FACEBOOK IN NEW YORK 
Plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed because this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over 
Facebook.  Facebook is not subject to general jurisdiction in New York because it is incorporated 
in Delaware with its principal place of business in California.  Compl. ¶ 32.  And Plaintiffs do 
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not allege any facts that would make this an “exceptional case” creating general jurisdiction 
outside a corporation’s state of incorporation or principal place of business.  Daimler AG v. 
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137, 139 n.19 (2014).   
Plaintiffs also fail to allege any basis for specific jurisdiction, which exists only where 
“the defendant’s suit-related conduct … create[s] a substantial connection with the forum state.”  
Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) (emphasis added); see also id. at 1122 (“We have 
consistently rejected attempts to satisfy the [personal jurisdiction] inquiry by demonstrating 
contacts between the plaintiff (or third parties) and the forum State.”).  Plaintiffs do not allege 
any conduct by Facebook targeted to New York.  Instead, as Plaintiffs’ repeatedly allege, their 
claims against Facebook are based on the availability of targeting tools that they claim may be 
used by housing advertisers to place discriminatory ads throughout the United States.  Compl. ¶¶ 
2, 4, 41-51.  But the law is clear that a plaintiff’s use of a website that is available throughout the 
United States is “not … sufficient for personal jurisdiction” in a particular state.  See Lopez v. 
Shopify, Inc., 2017 WL 2229868, at *8 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2017), report and 
recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 481891 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2018) (“the Court is not satisfied 
that the theoretical availability of RRHustle’s allegedly infringing goods to anyone with internet 
use in any state, including New York, means that Shopify has ‘purposefully directed’ its 
activities at New York”); Jewell v. Music Lifeboat, 254 F. Supp. 3d 410, 419-20 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) 
(the plaintiffs’ use of a website available throughout the United States was “not … sufficient for 
personal jurisdiction” in New York); accord Gullen v. Facebook.com, Inc., 2016 WL 245910, at 
*2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 2016) (rejecting Illinois plaintiffs’ attempt to bring claims against Facebook 
in Illinois because “the fact that its site is accessible to Illinois residents does not confer specific 
jurisdiction over Facebook”).   
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Here, Plaintiffs’ claims are based on targeting tools that are available for use throughout 
the United States, and indeed, throughout the world.  Facebook has not directed these tools to 
New York in any way, let alone in a way that would constitute “purposeful availment” of the 
benefits and protections of New York.  See D & R Global Selections, S.L. v. Bodega Olegario 
Falcon Pineiro, 29 N.Y.3d 292, 298 (2017) (“purposeful availment occurs when the non-
domiciliary seeks out and initiates contact with New York, solicits business in New York, and 
establishes a continuing relationship” giving rise to the lawsuit).  Asserting personal jurisdiction 
over Facebook in New York because Plaintiffs or a third party chooses to use these generally 
available targeting tools does not comport with due process, requiring conduct by Facebook to 
“create a substantial connection with” New York.  Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1121.  And Plaintiffs 
offer no explanation at all as to how their claims concerning the housing markets in Washington 
D.C., Miami, and San Antonio, see Compl. ¶¶ 75-84, 91-100, bear any connection to New York.6 
V. PLAINTIFFS LACK ARTICLE III STANDING 
Plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed because they have not alleged facts demonstrating 
Article III standing.  The “‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ of standing consists of three 
elements”:  (1) “an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the 
defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”  Spokeo, Inc. v. 
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).  Plaintiffs cannot meet this standard. 
                                                 
6 Facebook’s California forum selection provision also weighs in favor of declining to find that 
the court has personal jurisdiction under these circumstances.  Supra at 7-8; see, e.g., Agency 
Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Grand Rent A Car Corp., 98 F.3d 25, 29 (2d Cir. 1996); Creative Socio-
Medics Corp. v. City of Richmond, 219 F. Supp. 2d 300, 307 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
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In two directly analogous cases, federal courts of appeal have held that advocacy 
organizations, like Plaintiffs, lack standing to sue based on discriminatory housing 
advertisements.  In Fair Housing Council of Suburban Philadelphia v. Main Line Times, 141 
F.3d 439 (3d Cir. 1998), the plaintiff argued that it suffered injury when it “was forced to divert 
resources from counseling and other activities” because of “the discriminatory effect of … 
advertisements” placed in a local newspaper.  Id. at 442.  The court held that the plaintiff 
organization “failed to establish the necessary ‘causal connection between the injury and the 
[advertisements],’” because it alleged “discriminatory advertising generally,” not that it had 
suffered harm as a result of specific advertisements the newspaper printed.  Id. at 443.  Similarly, 
in Arkansas ACORN Fair Housing, Inc. v. Greystone Development, Ltd., 160 F.3d 433 (8th Cir. 
1998), the court held that the plaintiff organization lacked standing because it had not alleged 
“specific facts establishing distinct and palpable injuries fairly traceable to [the defendant’s] 
advertisements.”  Id. at 435. 
Here, Plaintiffs’ standing allegations are even more tenuous.  The plaintiff organizations 
in Main Line Times and Arkansas ACORN were at least able to point to actual ads they alleged 
were discriminatory, even though they were unable to connect those ads to their alleged injuries.  
Main Line Times, 141 F.3d at 443; Ark. ACORN, 160 F.3d at 434.  Here, Plaintiffs allege only 
fictitious ads that they created and targeted using the ad platform’s tools and the possibility that 
some unidentified third parties may use those tools to place real discriminatory ads.  See Compl. 
¶¶ 117-128.  This is plainly insufficient. 
Plaintiffs likely will argue that they can establish organizational standing under Havens 
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982).  But Havens serves only to underscore the 
deficiency in Plaintiffs’ allegations.  In Havens, a white housing applicant and a black housing 
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applicant inquired about availability at a particular apartment complex in Virginia.  The black 
applicant was told no apartments were available, and the white applicant was told the opposite.  
Id. at 368.  The organizational plaintiff in Havens, in other words, had shown precisely what 
Plaintiffs here have not: harm to its mission stemming from actual discrimination occurring with 
respect to specific housing opportunities.  Other courts have rightly interpreted Havens in this 
way, recognizing the “obvious difference” between a situation, like the one here, in which “an 
organization manufacturers the injury necessary to maintain a suit” and the situation in Havens 
where “an organization incurs diversion of resources and frustration of purpose damages as a 
result of specific documented incidents of unlawful discrimination.”  Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr., 
Inc. v. Lowder Realty Co., 236 F.3d 629, 642 (11th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs make a series of allegations regarding the expenditures they supposedly have 
made as a result of the targeting options on Facebook’s ad platform, including “public education 
campaigns” (Compl. ¶ 124), “draft[ing] guidelines for housing advertisers that it posted on its 
website” (id. ¶ 125), “design[ing] advertisements for social media” (id. ¶ 126), and “expend[ing] 
staff time to communicate and coordinate with each other” about their education campaigns (id. 
¶ 127).  But the problem for Plaintiffs is that they do not allege any facts tying these allegations 
to specific discriminatory uses of the targeting options these expenditures supposedly addressed.  
Absent a connection between these expenditures and “specific documented incidents of unlawful 
discrimination,” which Plaintiffs do not allege, Plaintiffs cannot “manufacture[]” their own 
“injury” for Article III purposes by pointing to fictitious and potential discriminatory ads.  
Lowder Realty, 236 F.3d at 642; see also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 416 
(2013) (rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to “manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on 
themselves” through expenditures “based on their fears of hypothetical future harm”).  And even 
Case 1:18-cv-02689-JGK   Document 28   Filed 06/04/18   Page 24 of 40
  17 
if this theory of injury were cognizable—which it is not—it still would not establish harm fairly 
traceable to Facebook because simply making these neutral targeting tools available does not 
have any “determinative or coercive effect” on any decision by an advertiser to use them in 
discriminatory ways.  Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997). 
VI. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY SECTION 230 OF THE CDA 
Plaintiffs seek to hold Facebook liable for discriminatory housing ads they allege 
unidentified third-party advertisers may have placed on Facebook.  Attempting to plead around 
the CDA, Plaintiffs frame their challenge as one to Facebook’s “conduct” in creating targeting 
tools, which they claim “make it possible” for advertisers to place discriminatory ads.  But 
Plaintiffs cannot escape the simple fact that, even under their theory of liability, there can be no 
violation of the FHA without publication of a discriminatory housing ad, and there can be no 
publication of a discriminatory housing ad unless a third-party advertiser runs a housing ad and 
uses the targeting tools in a way that results in discrimination.  See Compl. ¶ 2 (Facebook 
“makes it possible for housing advertisers to exclude certain home seekers from ever seeing their 
ads.”) (emphasis added); id. ¶ 4 (Facebook “provides the option for advertisers to exclude 
families with children and women from receiving advertisements, as well as users with interests 
based on disability and national origin,” and “approve and permits advertisers to publish these 
ads in a discriminatory manner.”) (emphasis added); id. ¶ 74 (Facebook “made it possible for 
housing advertisers to exclude people from seeing their ads on the basis of their family status;” 
Facebook “enabled housing advertisers to exclude people from seeing their ads on the basis of 
sex;” Facebook “enabled housing advertisers to exclude on the basis of interests that are the 
equivalent of protected characteristics.”) (emphasis added).   
The CDA prohibits Plaintiffs from seeking to impose liability on Facebook for publishing 
third-party content they allege is discriminatory.  Under Section 230 of the CDA, “[n]o provider 
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or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  The law 
bars liability “under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section,” id. § 230(e)(3), 
and also extends to federal claims.  The Second Circuit and courts across this country have 
“construed [Section 230] broadly” to “effectuate the statute’s speech-protective purpose.”  Ricci 
v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2015).   
Section 230 “was enacted based on a congressional concern that treating providers of 
computer services the same way as traditional publishers would impede the development of the 
Internet,” and Congress thus “made the legislative judgment to effectively immunize providers 
of interactive computer services from civil liability in tort with respect to material disseminated 
by them but created by others.”  Atl. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 
690, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  “None of this means, of course, that the original culpable party who 
posts [unlawful content] would escape accountability,” but “Congress made a policy choice” to 
preempt “tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties’ potentially 
injurious messages.”  Ricci, 781 F.3d at 28.  Because the CDA is intended to protect websites 
“not only from ‘ultimate liability,’ but also from ‘having to fight costly and protracted legal 
battles,” courts “aim to resolve the question of § 230 immunity at the earliest possible stage.” 
Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009).  Thus, 
courts routinely apply the CDA to dismiss cases on the pleadings.  See, e.g., Ricci, 781 F.3d at 
26; Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2018 WL 566457, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 
2018); Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d 140, 155 (E.D.N.Y. 2017); Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 
836 F.3d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 2016) (rejecting plaintiff’s “effort to circumvent the CDA’s 
protections through ‘creative’ pleading”). 
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CDA immunity applies when (1) the defendant is “a provider or user of an interactive 
computer service,” (2) “the claim is based on information provided by another information 
content provider,” and (3) “the claim would treat [the defendant] as the publisher or speaker of 
that information.”  FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 173 (2d Cir. 2016).  Applying 
this standard, courts repeatedly have held that the CDA protects Facebook from claims arising 
from it publication of content created by third parties alleged to be unlawful.  See, e.g., Klayman 
v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Cohen, 252 F. Supp. 3d at 158; Force v. 
Facebook, Inc., ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2018 WL 472807, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2018); Cross 
v. Facebook, Inc., 14 Cal. App. 5th 190, 206 (2017); Pennie v. Twitter, Inc., et al., 281 
F. Supp. 3d 874, 891-92 (N.D. Cal. 2017).  Courts have also applied the CDA to bar claims 
against websites, like Facebook, for publishing allegedly discriminatory housing ads.  See Chi. 
Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 
2008) (“given § 230(c)(1), [a plaintiff] cannot sue the messenger just because the message 
reveals a third party’s plan to engage in unlawful discrimination”).  The logic of these cases 
applies with equal force here because Plaintiffs assert that Facebook published allegedly 
discriminatory housing ads created by third parties. 
A. Facebook Is an Interactive Computer Service Provider 
It is beyond dispute that Facebook is a provider of an interactive computer service.  See, 
e.g., Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1357 (“Facebook qualifies as an interactive computer service because 
it is a service that provides information to ‘multiple users’ by giving them ‘computer access … to 
a computer server,’ 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2)”); Cohen, 252 F. Supp. 3d at 156 (same).   
B. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Based on Allegedly Discriminatory Housing Ads 
Created by Third-Party Advertisers 
The “information” upon which Plaintiffs’ claims are based—allegedly discriminatory 
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housing ads—is “provided by another information content provider.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  As 
Plaintiffs repeatedly allege, any discriminatory housing ads are created by advertisers.  See, e.g., 
Compl. ¶ 2 (targeting tools “make[] it possible for housing advertisers to exclude certain home 
seekers from ever seeing their ads”) (emphasis added); id. ¶ 4 (Facebook “provides the option for 
advertisers to exclude families with children and women from receiving advertisements”) 
(emphasis added); id. ¶¶ 40-58 (describing various ways in which “advertisers” create ads and 
use targeting tools).  Facebook is therefore not a “content creator” within the meaning of the 
CDA because Plaintiffs do not, and cannot, allege that Facebook “materially contribut[ed] to 
[the] alleged unlawfulness” of the content, or “assisted in the development of what made the 
content unlawful.”  LeadClick Media, 838 F.3d at 174 (emphases added); accord, e.g., Jones v. 
Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 410 (6th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “[a] 
material contribution” to the alleged illegality of content under the CDA “means being 
responsible for what makes the displayed content allegedly unlawful”).   
As explained below, Facebook’s creation of neutral targeting tools that third parties may 
use to place housing ads is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether Facebook is an 
“information content provider” under the CDA, as courts consistently have held.  See infra at 20-
22 & n.7 (collecting cases in which courts have held the CDA protects websites that provide 
“neutral tools” that third-party users may use for lawful or unlawful purposes).     
Here, what makes the content at issue allegedly unlawful is controlled by third-party 
advertisers who create the housing ads and then target them in ways Plaintiffs claim are 
discriminatory.  But Plaintiffs do not and cannot allege that Facebook makes these decisions.  
Instead, they allege that Facebook “makes it possible” for advertisers to make those decisions.  
But it is the decisions, not the possibility they will be made, that result in alleged discriminatory 
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housing ads.  Thus, third-party advertisers are the only “information content provider[s]” of the 
content at issue.   
The targeting tools challenged by Plaintiffs are exactly the type of “neutral tool[]” 
protected by the CDA.  Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 
521 F.3d 1157, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).  Courts uniformly have held that such neutral 
tools, which facilitate the publication of third-party content and may be used for either “proper or 
improper purposes,” do not “contribute[] materially to the alleged illegality” of third-party 
content.  Id. at 1168, 1172.  As a court in this district recently held, defendants “may not be held 
liable for so-called ‘neutral assistance,’ or tools and functionality that are available equally to 
bad actors and the [website’s] intended users.”  Herrick, 2018 WL 566457, at *5 (quoting 
LeadClick Media, 838 F.3d at 176).  Importantly, such neutral tools are protected even if they 
may be deemed in some sense to contribute to the illegality of the content at issue, as long as the 
tool are “equally to all users and are not intrinsically offensive or unlawful.”  Id. 
In Herrick, the plaintiff alleged that Grindr, an online dating app, had facilitated stalking 
and harassment by providing tools that allowed the plaintiff’s ex-boyfriend to “impersonate 
[him] by posting fake profiles to Grindr” that invited unwanted sexual advances.  2018 WL 
566457, at *1.  Like Plaintiffs here, the plaintiff attempted to avoid CDA immunity by arguing 
that “Grindr contributes to what makes the impersonating profiles offensive,” by creating and 
providing tools such as a “drop-down menu for ‘preferred sexual position,’” that were used by 
the plaintiffs’ ex-boyfriend to post fake profiles.  Id. at *5-6.  The court rejected this argument 
and dismissed the complaint with prejudice, emphasizing that “[t]o the extent Grindr contributes 
to the impersonating profiles, it is through [] … ‘neutral assistance’” in the form of tools that 
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were “available equally to all users and are not intrinsically offensive or unlawful.”  Id. at *5.7  
“There is nothing … illegal about Grindr’s drop-down menus, its geolocational function, or its 
sorting, aggregation, and display functions,” even though the defendant had allegedly misused 
those tools and functions for improper purposes.  Id. at *6. 
Herrick relied upon similar cases from other jurisdictions, most notably Carafano v. 
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).  See Herrick, 2018 WL 566457, at *5.  In 
Carafano, a dating website provided its users with a “detailed questionnaire” that included 
multiple-choice questions where “members select[ed] answers ... from menus providing between 
four and nineteen options” in creating their profiles.  339 F.3d at 1121.  The plaintiff argued that 
these menus included “sexually suggestive” phrases that facilitated the creation of a defamatory 
impersonated profile.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit held that “[d]oubtless, the questionnaire facilitated 
the expression of information by individual users” but the “selection of the content was left 
exclusively to the user”; thus, the defendant “cannot be considered an ‘information content 
provider’” because “no profile has any content until a user actively creates it.”  Id. at 1124.8   
                                                 
7 An prior ruling by the same court had dismissed an earlier version of the complaint as well.  
See Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 2017 WL 744605 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2017). 
8 Numerous other cases, many of which were cited and discussed by the Herrick court, are to the 
same effect.  See, e.g., Saponaro v. Grindr, LLC, 93 F. Supp. 3d 319, 324 (D.N.J. 2015) (holding 
that Grindr was entitled to CDA immunity against claim that it improperly allowed minors to use 
its app because it “merely provided neutral tools to carry out what may be unlawful or illicit 
conduct”); Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., 2017 WL 5665670, at *1, *10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 
26, 2017) (holding that a “social-network website” was entitled to CDA immunity against claim 
brought by the mother of a man who died of a heroin overdose alleging that the cite “us[ed] its 
proprietary algorithms” to “steer[]” her son toward drug forums and dealers, because the website 
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The same is true here.  The availability of neutral targeting tools, which advertisers may 
but are not required to use, are not “what made the content [allegedly discriminatory housing 
ads] unlawful.”  LeadClick Media, 838 F.3d at 174.  Any such ads are the result of decisions 
made by third parties to create and target their ads in allegedly discriminatory ways. 
C. Plaintiffs’ Claims Treat Facebook as a Publisher or Speaker 
The final element of CDA immunity also is satisfied because Plaintiffs are attempting to 
impose liability on Facebook because it allegedly “permits advertisers to publish … ads in a 
discriminatory manner,” Compl. ¶ 4 (emphasis added), and “enables advertisers to seek out” and 
“target” “potential audiences with great specificity,” id. ¶ 44.  See also id. ¶ 52 (third party 
“create[s]” an ad “to be published on its Facebook page”); id. ¶ 131(b) (Facebook has “[m]a[de], 
print[ed], or publish[ed], or caus[ed] to be made, printed, or published” unlawful 
advertisements).  Selling ad space to third parties and allowing them to choose the target 
audience for their ads is a classic publishing activity protected by the CDA. 
Courts have recognized that a lawsuit treats a defendant as a publisher or speaker when it 
seeks to “hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial 
                                                 
“merely provide[d] a framework that could be utilized for proper or improper purposes”); 
Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1197-98 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (Google’s “Keyword 
Tool” that “suggest[ed] the phrase ‘free ringtone” to advertisers, allegedly facilitating fraudulent 
advertising, was a “neutral tool” because it did “nothing more than provide options that 
advertisers may adopt or reject at their discretion”); Baldino’s Lock & Key Serv., Inc. v. Google 
LLC, 285 F. Supp. 3d 276, 282 (D.D.C. 2018) (CDA protected Google’s provision of “neutral 
mapping tools” that certain businesses used fraudulently); Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 
562 (N.C. App. 2012) (pricing tool for tickets that suggested prices above that allowed by law 
was “a prototypically ‘neutral tool’”). 
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functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content.”  
LeadClick Media, 838 F.3d at 174.  “A provider of information services might get sued for 
violating anti-discrimination laws … or even for negligent publication of advertisements that 
cause harm to third parties. … [W]hat matters is not the name of the cause of action,” but 
“whether the duty that the plaintiff alleges the defendant violated derives from the defendant’s 
status or conduct as a ‘publisher or speaker.’”  Barnes v. Yahoo! Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101-02 
(9th Cir. 2009); accord LeadClick Media, 838 F.3d at 175 (quoting and citing Barnes on this 
point); Herrick, 2018 WL 566457, at *6 (noting that “[c]ourts have interpreted ‘publication’ 
capaciously to reach claims that, although pleaded to avoid the CDA, ‘implicitly require recourse 
to that content [posted by a third party] to establish liability or implicate a defendant’s role’”) 
(quoting Cohen, 252 F. Supp. 3d 156). 
Applying these principles, numerous cases recognize that the publication of third-party 
ads falls squarely within the realm of traditional publisher functions protected by the CDA, even 
if the ads themselves are discriminatory or otherwise unlawful under federal or state law.  See, 
e.g., Chi. Lawyers Comm., 519 F.3d at 671-72 (CDA barred claim against Craigslist for 
publishing allegedly discriminatory housing ads in violation of federal FHA); Goddard, 640 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1195-96 (CDA barred claim premised on “allegedly fraudulent web-based 
advertisements” published by Google); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 
1997) (CDA barred claim premised on allegedly fraudulent third-party ads). 
Likewise, Facebook’s provision of tools that allow “an advertiser” to “customize exactly 
who will receive its advertisement” and control “where and how frequently the ad appears on the 
Facebook accounts of its targeted audience,” Compl. ¶ 57, falls squarely within the traditional 
publisher functions protected by the CDA.  Indeed, publishers routinely allow advertisers to 
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target ads and assist them in doing so.  For instance, newspapers might sell sporting-goods stores 
advertising space in the sports section.  A broadcast network might sell some advertisers airtime 
on one channel while selling other advertisers airtime on another.  The publication of ads entails 
more than blindly displaying them; it also entails providing advertisers tools that they can use to 
reach their target audience. 
That is the same type of service Facebook and other online publishers protected by the 
CDA offer to advertisers.  Courts have consistently held in analogous contexts that ad targeting is 
a traditional publisher function protected by the CDA.  See, e.g., Jane Doe No. 1 v. 
Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 622 (2017) (tools 
allowing ad buyers to “target their advertisements” based on geography would be protected); 
Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1169 (tools allowing users “to specify whether they will or will not 
receive emails” from others “by means of user-defined criteria” would be protected, even though 
such tools “might help some users exclude email from other users of a particular race or sex”).  
All of Plaintiffs’ claims are based on alleged discriminatory uses of targeting tools by third-party 
advertisers in selecting the audience for their ads.  “Facebook’s role in publishing that content is 
thus an essential causal element of [Plaintiffs’] claims.”  Cohen, 252 F. Supp. 3d at 158.  Thus, 
Plaintiffs claims attempt to treat Facebook as the publisher of unlawful content and are barred by 
the CDA. 
VII. PLAINTIFFS DO NOT ALLEGE ANY UNLAWFUL CONDUCT BY FACEBOOK   
A. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim Under the Fair Housing Act  
Plaintiffs allege that “Facebook’s creation of [targeting tools] on its advertising platform 
that facilitate unlawful discrimination in housing advertisements” by third-parties violate three 
provisions of the FHA: 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (c), and (f).  Compl. ¶ 131.  None of these 
provisions apply to Facebook under Plaintiffs’ novel theory of liability which challenges ad 
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targeting, as opposed to content, and seeks to hold a publisher liable for those targeting decisions 
made by advertisers.  No court has adopted this expansive view of the FHA, and this Court 
should reject Plaintiffs’ invitation to be the first to do so.   
Plaintiffs fail to state any claim against Facebook under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) and (f).  
These provisions make it unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, 
or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny” or 
“refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny” a dwelling 
because of membership in a protected class.  But Plaintiffs do not, and cannot, allege that 
Facebook sells or rents any dwelling.  Instead, they allege that “housing advertisers” do this.  
Compl. ¶ 2 (targeting tools “enable landlords and real estate brokers to bar families with 
children, women, and others from receiving rental and sales ads for housing” and “make[ ] it 
possible for housing advertisers to exclude certain home seekers from ever seeing their ads”).  
Moreover, neither of these provisions apply to claims based on advertising, let alone targeted 
advertising.  See Hous. Opportunities Made Equal v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 
801, 803 n.1 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (holding that claim against publisher under § 3604(a) based on 
allegedly discriminatory advertisements was “without any basis”), aff’d, 943 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 
1991).      
Nor do Plaintiffs state any claim against Facebook under these provisions based on a 
disparate impact theory.  A disparate-impact claim under the FHA requires a plaintiff to allege 
“facts at the pleading stage” consisting of “statistical evidence demonstrating a causal 
connection” between the challenged conduct of the defendant and a disparity based on protected 
classes.  Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
2523 (2015); see also id. at 2524 (cautioning that courts must “examine with care … at the 
Case 1:18-cv-02689-JGK   Document 28   Filed 06/04/18   Page 34 of 40
  27 
pleading stage” whether a plaintiff has stated a disparate-impact claim, lest defendants face 
“abusive disparate-impact claims” that “displace valid governmental and private priorities”).  
Plaintiffs do not even attempt to make such allegations.  Nor do Plaintiffs allege any facts 
meeting the “robust causality requirement” the law requires.  Id. at 2523.  Any discriminatory 
targeting would be caused by the intentional choices of advertisers alone. 
Plaintiffs also fail to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c), which makes it unlawful to 
“make, print, or publish … any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or 
rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on” 
membership in a protected class.  A HUD regulation, also cited by Plaintiff, provides that it is a 
violation of Section 3604(c) to “[s]elect[] media or locations for advertising the sale or rental of 
dwellings which deny particular segments of the housing market information about housing 
opportunities” based on such class membership.  24 C.F.R. § 100.75(c)(3).  While this provision 
and its related regulation, unlike the first two provisions above, address advertising, Plaintiffs’ 
theory of liability as to Facebook still fails.   
First, Plaintiffs do not allege any actual housing ads targeted in a discriminatory way 
have been “made, printed, or published” on Facebook.  Their own fictitious ads offering 
fictitious housing opportunities do not qualify.  Second, even if Plaintiffs were able to identify 
housing ads targeted by advertisers in a discriminatory way, Section 3604(c) does not extend to 
those targeting decisions.  The standard applied in determining whether an ad “indicates any 
preference, limitation, or discrimination” in violation of Section 3604 (c) is whether it “suggests 
to an ordinary reader” that a protected class of individuals is “is preferred or dispreferred for the 
housing in question.”  Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999 (2d Cir. 1991).  This test 
assumes that the plaintiff actually sees an advertisement whose content is either facially or 
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implicitly discriminatory.  Here, Plaintiffs challenge that targeting decisions by advertisers, not 
any advertisement whose content itself is allegedly discriminatory.  Plaintiffs therefore fail to 
state a claim under section 3604(c).  Cf. Hous. Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati 
Enquirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644, 646 (6th Cir. 1991) (rejecting claim under section 3604(c) against 
publisher based on allegedly discriminatory “aggregate” effect of multiple advertisements). 
Plaintiffs’ reliance on 24 C.F.R. § 100.75(c)(3) is misplaced.  As noted above, this 
regulation prohibits “[s]electing media or locations for advertising.”  This plain language applies 
to advertisers selecting media or locations for ads, not to Facebook and other platforms on which 
ads are placed.  No case has held, or even suggested, that publishers, such as Facebook, are 
subject to this regulation.  See Martinez v. Optimus Props., LLC, 2017 WL 1040743, at *5 (C.D. 
Cal. Mar. 14, 2017) (claim against advertiser challenging allegedly discriminatory ad targeting 
decisions); Guevara v. UMH Props., Inc., 2014 WL 5488918, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 29, 2014) 
(same); South-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Greater South Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868, 
873 (7th Cir. 1991) (same). 
In addition, even if the HUD regulation applied to publishers—which it does not—the 
regulation is invalid because it is inconsistent with the statute, which prohibits advertisements 
that “indicate[] any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on” a protected class.  42 
U.S.C. § 3604(c) (emphasis added); see Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1334 
(2013) (“[R]egulations, in order to be valid, must be consistent with the statute under which they 
are promulgated.”).  The statutory text encompasses only ads that, on their face, are either 
explicitly or implicitly discriminatory.  See Ragin, 923 F.2d at 999.  It does not cover ad 
targeting. 
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Finally, Plaintiffs cannot rely on an aiding-or-abetting theory of liability to skirt these 
fatal flaws in their FHA claims.  The text of the FHA does not provide for such liability, so it is 
not available.  See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 
164, 176 (1994); Rivera v. Incorporated Village of Farmingdale, 2011 WL 1260195, at *3 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2011) (noting that an aiding-and-abetting theory of liability under the FHA 
has not been recognized). 
B. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim Under New York Law  
First and foremost, Plaintiffs’ claims under New York law fail because Facebook’s terms 
of service, which govern Plaintiffs’ relationship with Facebook, contain a valid California 
choice-of-law clause.  Supra at 6-8 & n.3 (noting Plaintiffs’ assent to Facebook’s terms of 
service and California choice-of-law clause); see, e.g., Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 883 F. Supp. 
2d 511, 513-14 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (dismissing claim under Human Rights Law based on choice-
of-law and forum-selection clauses).  Each Plaintiff therefore agreed that any claim they may 
have against Facebook would be governed by California law, not New York law. 
Even if New York law could apply, Plaintiffs’ claim would still fail.  Plaintiffs rely 
entirely on the aiding-and-abetting provision of the Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code 
§ 8-107(6), see Compl. ¶¶ 134-137, which New York courts have held, in construing parallel 
language under New York state law, is subject to common law principles of aiding and abetting.  
See Nat’l Org. for Women v. Buffalo Courier-Express, Inc., 337 N.Y.S.2d 608, 610 (Sup. Ct. 
1972) (applying “judicial principles governing criminal liability through accessorial conduct”); 
accord Foley v. Mobil Chem. Co., 647 N.Y.S.2d 374, 381 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (the “concept of an 
aider and abettor written into the [Human Rights Law] must retain its common law 
characteristics in the absence of [express] statutory definition”).  These common law principles 
foreclose Plaintiffs’ theory of liability.   
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Aiding-and-abetting liability requires a plaintiff to plead and prove that the defendant had 
a “shared intent or purpose” with the person committing the offense.  People v. Kaplan, 76 
N.Y.2d 140, 144-45 (1990); accord Buffalo Courier-Express, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 610 (same).  Here, 
even assuming Plaintiffs could allege any actual discriminatory housing ads placed by 
advertisers, they do not and cannot allege that Facebook shared a discriminatory intent or 
purpose with those unidentified advertisers.  Allegations that Facebook made available neutral 
targeting tools to all advertisers and that some of those advertisers may misuse them does not 
come close to demonstrating a shared illegal intent.  Common law principles also require an 
aider and abettor to provide “substantial assistance” to the offender, which “means more than 
just performing routine business services for the alleged” violator.  McBride v. KPMG Int’l, 135 
A.D.3d 576, 579 (App. Div. 2016).  But, again, that is all that Plaintiffs allege here—that 
Facebook made available neutral targeting tools to all advertisers that some may use to target 
housing ads in ways Plaintiffs claim are discriminatory.  Compl. ¶¶ 40-58.   
Moreover, in cases that involved print publishers and predated enactment of the CDA, 
New York courts rejected attempts to impose liability on print publishers on an aiding-and-
abetting theory unless the ad at issue is unlawful on its face, which Plaintiffs do not allege here.  
See In re N.Y. Times Co. v. City of N.Y. Comm’n on Human Rights, 41 N.Y.2d 345, 351 (1977); 
see also Buffalo Courier-Express, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 610-11.  In the Times case, the appellate court 
rejected claims by the Human Rights Commission that, by publishing employment ads in 
apartheid-era South Africa, the Times was liable for aiding or abetting discriminatory 
employment practices in South Africa, id. at 358, 361, holding that the Times “may be held as an 
aider and abettor of discrimination only if it published advertisements that expressed 
discrimination,” id. at 351 (emphasis added).  Under that standard, which is binding New York 
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law, there is no claim against Facebook on an aiding-and-abetting theory. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court should transfer this action to the Northern District of 
California, or, alternatively, dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint without leave to amend. 
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